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THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSIONER
IN BASEBALL
JONATHAN M. REINSDORF*
I. PRE-COMMISSIONER ERA
A. Inception of Baseball
Baseball began as an amateur sport sometime in the first half of the
nineteenth century.' The first known amateur team, the Knickerbocker
Baseball Club of New York, was formed in 1842 Throughout the 1850s
amateur baseball teams flourished throughout the east coast of
America. As more teams appeared the public became more interested
in the game.4 With the advent of spectator gambling, it was clear that
baseball was becoming a commercial activity.5
As commercialism set in, baseball teams looked for different ways of
improving attendance.6 At the same time, promoters understood the po-
tential for making a profit.1 In the 1860s, some baseball clubs began
secretly paying players in order to acquire the better players.,
In 1869, the Cincinnati Red Stockings became the first professional
baseball club when it openly payed its players.9 The Red Stockings en-
joyed tremendous financial success and, soon, others professional base-
ball clubs appeared.' 0 For the next 30 years competition was fierce over
who was going to reap the financial rewards that baseball had to offer.
* The author would like to thank Professor Stephen B. Goldberg of the Northwestern
University School of Law and Samuel Fifer, Esq. of the law firm Sonnenschein Nath & Rosen-
thal for their assistance in the creation of this article.
1. HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS 3-12 (1960). The exact date of the
start of baseball is in much dispute.
2. Id. at 15.
3. Id. at 23-28.
4. Id at 29.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 47.
7. Id.
8. Id at 47-48.
9. Id. at 56. In 1867, the people of Cincinnati were bitter when the Washington Nationals,
who happened to be on tour, decisively beat the Red Stockings. Many felt that Cincinnati
must have a winning team, even if that meant paying the players. Subsequently, Harry Wright
assembled on all-professional baseball team. Id.
10. Id. at 57-59.
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Teams which were financially strong stole players from other teams
by offering them higher salaries.11 Those teams who could not afford to
do so suffered and faced financial destruction if they got involved with
the bidding wars. 2 As a result, the richer owners built teams that could
not be beaten by the poorer owners.' 3 Yet, because of the lack of com-
petition, the richer teams had difficulty getting spectators to attend their
games.1
4
This is an important point because it underlies the difference be-
tween baseball and other businesses. In most industries, a company will
benefit when it has no competition. Unlike most businesses, though, no
baseball team can survive without the existence of its competitors.
Realizing this dynamic of baseball, eight teams formed the National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs.' 5 However, these eight teams
did not want any competition from teams not in their league.1 6 When
the non-league teams could not gain access to the National League,
some started rival leagues.1 7
Over the next two decades, the National League waged war against
any league that attempted to share in its wealth.' s When a rival league
could not be destroyed, the National League would agree to peace in
exchange for some control.' 9 However, when the National League
could, it would dispose of the peace agreements and leave the rival
league to fold.20
When the cheating, lying, coercion and conspiring was over, the Na-
tional League had established a virtual monopoly over professional
baseball. However, it had done so at a high cost.2 ' While it no longer
had to worry about getting into bidding wars over its players, its teams
11. Id. at 75.
12. Id
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 78-80. The formation took place at a meeting on February 2, 1876. Id. at 80. At
this meeting the teams adopted a league constitution. The constitution stated that the teams
had a desire to promote each other's interests. Id. at 80.
16. Id. at 94.
17. Id. at 99.
18. Id. at 94-103, 135-71.
19. Id. at 135-71. For example, a league called the International Association of Profes-
sional Baseball Players was formed. Id at 99. The National League could not initially get rid
of the league, so it signed a pact with the new league called the "League Alliance." Id at 100.
20. Id. at 145-79, 249-60, 309-19. The National League abolished the "League Alliance"
five years later when it became clear that the International League was no longer any kind of
threat. Id at 10.
21. Id. at 266.
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were heavily in debt.' Subsequently, the National League teams began
slashing players' salaries to lower their debt.23 The players became very
angry over this.24
In 1901, another league threatened the National League's monopoly
over baseball.' 5 The old Midwestern League, under the leadership of
Ban Johnson, had changed its name to the American League.26 The
American League capitalized on the National League players' anger and
began paying higher salaries to the best players in the National League.27
Immediately, the American League was successful in stealing players
from the National League.2s By 1902, the American League had a
higher season attendance than the National League. 9
It was clear to the National League that it could not win the war with
the American League.30 Thus, in December of 1902, the National
League asked the American League for a peace treaty.31 In early 1903,
the two leagues ended the bidding war and established a single ruling
committee, the National Commission (Commission). 32
B. National Commission
The National Commission consisted of the President from each
league and another member who served as Chairman.33 Harry Pulliam,
the President of the National League, Ban Johnson, the American
League President, and the Chairman, Garry Herrmann, club President
of the National League Cincinnati Reds, were the original three mem-
bers of the National Commission? 4
The National League originated in 1876. It had successfully fought
off all outsiders who tried to force their way into professional baseball.
Therefore, when the National League had to accept the American
22. Id.
23. Id. at 267.
24. JOHN HELYAR, LORDS OF THE REALM 5 (1994).
25. EUGENE C. MuRDocI, BAN JOHNSON: CZAR OF BASEBALL 48 (1982).
26. SEYMOUR, supra note 1, at 308.
27. Id.
28. MURDOCK, supra note 25, at 48. In 1901, the American League convinced forty-five
National League players to sign with American League teams. Id.
29. Id. at 58.
30. Id. at 60-61.
31. Id. at 61.
32. SEYMOUR, supra note 1, at 323.
33. 2 HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE 10 (1971).
34. Id. at 10. The National League changed presidents numerous times during the exist-
ence of the National Commission. See MURDOCK, supra note 25, at 68.
35. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 8.
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League as an equal, the National League owners were extremely bitter.3 6
Additionally, neither league wanted to give up its autonomy by merging
into one big league. 7 Yet, it was clear to each league that if disputes
arose, there had to be a way of resolving them. The National Commis-
sion was the answer.38
Disputes soon arose between the two leagues.3 9 Most of the initial
disputes involved claims of ownership over players.4 0 Disputes also
arose over scheduling problems.41 Throughout these disputes it was
clear that much of the animosity between the two leagues remained.4
The Commission did a moderate job in maintaining peace and foster-
ing growth for the two leagues.43 However, political fighting among the
different owners, along with an inability of the Commission to deal with
gambling problems, lead to the National Commission's downfall.44
36. SEYMOUR, supra note 1, at 323.
37. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 16. Although a plan was devised by Frank Robison, Pres-
ident of the St. Louis National League Team, which would combine the two leagues, neither
league would agree. In fact, the American League went so far as to pass a resolution that
forbade a uniting of the leagues. Id.
38. Id. at 9. Additionally, the Commission was to implement the National Agreement,
which included acting as an arbitrator when disputes arose between Major League and Minor
League teams. Id. The Commission was also given the power to impose fines and suspensions
for violations of this agreement. Id. at 15-16.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 40. During the bidding war, each league induced players to break their con-
tracts and join the other league. Although the peace settlement was supposed to settle all
disputes, some disputes remained. For example, Nap Lajoie, then a member of the Philadel-
phia Phillies, jumped his contract to play for the American League's Philadelphia team. In
response, the Phillies obtained a court injunction. Lajoie was then traded to the American
League Cleveland team. After the peace settlement, the Phillies demanded compensation
from Cleveland before it would quash the injunction. Eventually, Herrmann was able to con-
vince the Phillies to give in. Id. at 11-12.
41. Id. at 13. The two leagues did not start their seasons at the same time. Rather, each
league would try to start before the other. In addition, when one league published its sched-
ule for the coming year, the other would often purposely schedule conflicts. A conflict oc-
cured when two teams in the same city played home games on the same day. Id.
42. Id. at 14. In 1904, John T. Brush, the owner of the New York Giants, would not allow
his team to play against the Boston Red Sox in the World Series. When asked why, Brush said
that he would not allow his team to play in a World Series with Boston because Boston was
nothing more than a winner of a minor league championship. Id.
43. Id. at 18.
44. Jeffrey A. Durney, Comment, Fair or Foul? The Commissioner and Major League
Baseball's Disciplinary Process, 41 EMORY L.J. 584 (1992).
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C. Downfall of the National Commission
Aside from the animosity between the two leagues, there was much
intraleague dislike among some team owners.45 National League ownters
were constantly fighting over the National League Presidency.46 The
American League initially enjoyed ownership unity. 47 However, things
changed when Charles A. Comiskey, the owner of the Chicago White
Sox, and Ban Johnson had a falling OUt.48 Comiskey and Johnson, who
had been friends, were the two most important men in the creation of
the American League.49 The Commission actually increased inter-
league fighting because the owners were disillusioned with the authority
of the Commission, and each League believed the other was taking ad-
vantage of it through the Commission.
This mutual distrust stemmed from two factors: the friendship be-
tween Garry Herrmann and Ban Johnson, and Herrmann's status as
president of the Cincinnati Reds.50 Herrmann had the tie-breaking vote
in matters before the National Commission.5' Many of the National
League owners believed Johnson controlled the actions of Herrmann,
thereby giving the American League control over the Commission.5 At
the same time, American League owners believed that because Herr-
mann was president of a National League team, the National League
had control of the Commission.53 Every time the Commission ruled on a
controversial matter, the Commission's downfall loomed nearer.
45. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 23. Most of the fighting took place among National
League owners.
46. Id. at 25-37.
47. Id. at 23. This may have had to do with the fact that Ban Johnson, the President of the
American League, had possession of 51% of the stock of the American League teams. Origi-
nally, Johnson had required the owners in the American League to deposit the stock with him
when the League was formed. This was done to ensure that no team could desert the League.
Id
48. Id. It is unclear when the actual falling out occurred. One story is that Comiskey,
Johnson and others went on a hunting trip together. As a practical joke, someone removed
the bullets from Johnson's gun and replaced them with duds. Thus, Johnson was unable to hit
anything with his gun. Comiskey teased Johnson about not hitting anything. When Johnson
found out about the prank, he blamed Comiskey and did not talk to him for months. In
reality, the rift was probably caused by Johnson's upholding an umpire's suspension of James
Holmes, an outfielder on the Chicago White Sox, for abusive language. Id
49. Id. at 23.
50. Depak Sathy, Reconstruction: Baseball's New Future, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT, 27,40-
43 (1994).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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In particular, four incidents led to the dissolution of the Commis-
sion. 4 The first dealt with conflicting claims between the St. Louis
Browns and the Pittsburgh Pirates over George Sisler.55 In 1911, at age
seventeen, Sisler signed a contract with the Akron team of the Ohio-
Pennsylvania League.5 6 When Sisler's father discovered that George
had signed a contract, he repudiated the contract.5 7 Sisler subsequently
enrolled in college at the University of Michigan.58 In August of 1912,
the Columbus Club of the American Association, which controlled the
Akron Club, sold Sisler's contract to the Pittsburgh Pirates for $5,000.59
Upon reading that he had been sold to the Pirates, Sisler became
concerned.6
At this point, Sisler and his father informed the National Commis-
sion that the contract was invalid because George had signed the con-
tract as a minor.61 Fearing threats of a lawsuit, the Commission ruled
that Sisler was a free agent and could sign with any team.6 2 However,
the Commission believed that Pittsburgh should be compensated for the
$5000 it spent in purchasing Sisler's contract.63 The Commission at-
tempted to give Pittsburgh another chance to sign Sisler before other
teams.64
Instead of signing with Pittsburgh, though, Sisler signed with the St.
Louis Browns, who were in the other league.65 The manager of the
Browns was Branch Rickey, Sisler's coach at Michigan.66 Dreyfuss, the
owner of the Pirates, was absolutely furious over the turn of events. 67
54. Id.
55. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 259.
56. MURDOCK, supra note 25, at 159-60.
57. Id. at 160. Since Sisler was seventeen at the time, his father's approval was required
for a valid contract. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 160. If Sisler were deemed to have signed the contract with the Pirates, his
amateur status could have been taken away from him. This would have made Sisler ineligible
for college sports. See SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 259-60.
61. MuRDocK, supra note 25, at 160.
62. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 260. Herrman consulted a lawyer who told him that
Sisler's contract was invalid. The lawyer further stated that the Commission could lose a con-
spiracy suit and pay damages if it tried to force Sisler to play with Pittsburgh. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 261.
66. Id. at 259-61.
67. Id. at 261.
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He charged that Rickey got Sisler to sign a contract with the Browns by
tampering with him.68
Although it appeared that Rickey did manipulate the situation, the
Commission found no proof to substantiate Dreyfuss's claim. 69 The
Commission ruled 2 to 1, with Herrmann casting the tie breaking vote,
that Sisler was the property of the Browns. 7° Dreyfuss believed that Ban
Johnson influenced Garry Herrmann to rule in favor of the Browns in
order to get Sisler out of the National League.71 Following this incident,
Dreyfuss began calling for the restructuring of the National
Commission.72
The second incident concerned the ownership fights to Scott Perry.73
In 1917, the Boston Braves purchased Perry's contract for $2500.74
Perry later breached his contract and went to play for a semi-pro team in
Joliet, Illinois.75 At this point the National Commission ruled that if
Perry ever decided to rejoin organized baseball, Boston would have
ownership rights to him.76
Perry did return to organized baseball, but signed a contract with
Connie Mack's Philadelphia Athletics.7 7 Initially, Boston did not protest
the signing because it doubted Perry's athletic ability.78 As the season
unfolded, Perry excelled and won over twenty games. 79 Realizing its
mistake, Boston sought to have its fights to Perry reinstated.80
With the President of the Southern Association and the Secretary of
the National Association participating in the vote, the National Commis-
sion voted 3-2 in favor of Boston.81 However, the Athletics refused to
68. MuR.oc, supra note 25, at 163. Specifically, Dreyfuss said that Rickey had taken
"advantage of his personal friendship with Sisler to enter a bargaining war with Pittsburgh."
Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 261.
73. Id. at 262.
74. Id.
75. MuRioc'c, supra note 25, at 163.
76. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 262.
77. Mumioc-m, supra note 25, at 163.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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give Perry to Boston. 2 Connie Mack went to court and secured an in-
junction forbidding Boston from interfering with his use of Perry.83
This infuriated Dreyfuss because he had adhered to the Commis-
sion's decision in the Sisler matter, only to watch Philadelphia, with
Johnson's approval, go to court and avoid complying with the Commis-
sion's ruling.84 In addition, Tener, the current president of the National
League, was equally unhappy with the actions of Philadelphia.8 5 In fact,
he urged the National League owners to cease all relations with the
American League until Philadelphia returned Perry to the Braves. 86
When the National League owners refused to take Tener's position, he
resigned. 7
The Perry incident illustrated that the National League and Ameri-
can League were stiff adversarial in their relations. In addition, Philadel-
phia sought an injunction which created a precedent where the National
Commission's actions could be second guessed. 8
The National Commission, however, survived due to the strength of
Ban Johnson. His actions were approved by the American League own-
ers.89 As long as he had the support of the American League owners,
the Commission would have the support of at least half of all the owners.
However, a third incident led to the weakening of Johnson's author-
ity in the American League and, thus, the further decline of the Commis-
sion. 9 Due to World War I, many minor league teams ceased
operations.91 Charles Comiskey wanted to sign Jack Quinn, a pitcher for
Vernon, a team that had ceased operations. 92 Comiskey sought a ruling
from the National Commission that Quinn was a free agent.93 The Com-
mission told Comiskey that he could sign Quinn.94
Unbeknownst to the Commission, while Comiskey was seeking a rul-
ing, the New York Yankees purchased Quinn's contract from the Vernon
82. Id. at 164.
83. Id.
84. MURDOCK, supra note 25, at 164.
85. Id. at 165.
86. Id.
87. Id. Tener's replacement as president of the National League was John Heydler. Prior
to assuming responsibility as president, Heydler served as league secretary. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. J.G. TAYLOR SPINK, JUDGE LANDIS AND TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BASEBALL 49
(1947).
91. Id.
92. MURDOCK, supra note 25, at 157.
93. Id. at 156-57.
94. Id. at 156-57.
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Club.95 The National Commission held that the Yankees had a superior
claim, despite its prior ruling.96
Comiskey blamed Ban Johnson for the ruling of the Commission,
and decided that Johnson needed to be removed from the Commission.97
Since Johnson began to lose support of the American League, the Com-
mission also began to lose support of the American League."
In addition, there was an incident involving Carl Mays that caused
the owners of the Yankees, Jacob Ruppert and Tillinghast L'Hommedieu
Huston, to join with Comiskey in an attempt to rid the Commission of
Johnson. 99 In 1920, Herrmann's term as Chairman was over. 100 Because
Johnson had lost standing in the American League and the National
League President, John Heydler, refused to support Herrmann, Johnson
was unable to get Herrmann re-elected.' 0 '
For the entire 1920 season the National Commission did not have a
Chairman. 0 2 The rift between the American and National League still
existed. The end of the Commission was in sight, and one final incident
would perform the final burial rites.0 3
In 1919, the White Sox were favored to win the World Series.'04
However, the team lost to the Cincinnati Reds five games to three in the
Series. 10 5 The next year, it surfaced that eight players from the White
Sox were involved in throwing the 1919 Series.' 0 6 Up to this point, there
had been isolated rumors that some players were involved in gambling,
95. 1& at 157.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 264-73. Carl Mays, a Boston Red Sox pitcher, walked off
the field in the middle of a game against the White Sox. Mays ignored Red Sox President
Harry Frazee's order to play and went fishing. As a result, Ban Johnson suspended Mays
indefinately and issued instructions to umpires that Mays was not allowed to pitch games in a
Yankee uniform. The Yankees procured a temporary injunction restraining Johnson and the
umpires from prohibiting Mays from pitching. As the season went on, the intensity of the
feud grew. The Yankees finished in third place, but Johnson convinced Herrmann to withold
its award for finishing in third place. The Yankees filed suit against Johnson, claiming he had
planned to drive the Yankees out of baseball. The club owners met to resolve the problem.
The owners decided to reinstate Mays without penalty and New York received its third place
money. See Sathy, supra note 49, at n.53 (citation omitted).
100. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 272.
101. SpiNK, supra note 90, at 53.
102. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 273.
103. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 311.
104. ld. at 294.
105. Id. at 295.
106. Durney, supra note 44, at 584. In September of 1920, a Cook County Illinois special
grand jury began investigating baseball gambling, particularly the 1919 World Series. After
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but in general people could not believe that a World Series could be
thrown. 10 7 When the story broke in the papers, the public was
outraged. 10 8
Desperate to fix the tarnished image of professional baseball, the
owners decided to implement drastic changes. 0 9 The National Commis-
sion was dissolved and plans were made to elect a powerful Commis-
sioner.110 While some people argue that the Black Sox scandal
destroyed the National Commission, it was clear before the scandal that
the 'Commission was doomed."'
II. THE CREATION OF THE COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
A. Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis
The baseball owners decided to approach Judge Kenesaw Mountain
Landis about becoming the chairman of a new commission that would
rule over baseball.112 Landis was appointed a federal judge in 1905 at
the age of 39.113 The baseball owners were familiar with him because he
had served as judge during a lawsuit brought by members of the Federal
League against the National and American Leagues." 4 During the trial,
Landis showed himself to be a big fan of professional baseball.115 His
reputation for integrity made him the owners' choice as their new
leader.116
A committee of owners approached Landis about becoming the new
chairman of baseball.117 Landis would accept the job, provided he had
absolute power when making decisions. 18 The members of the commit-
numerous witnesses testified, two of the White Sox players confessed to fixing games and
implicated six of their teammates. The grand jury indicted all eight players. Id. at 585.
107. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 274-93.
108. Id at 304.
109. SpiNK, supra note 90, at 64.
110. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 311-23.
111. Id. at 311. During the Carl Mays affair, Albert D. Lasker, a stockholder of the Chi-
cago Cubs, devised the plan that would eventually be installed. This was almost one year
before the Black Sox scandal surfaced. Id
112. Id. The Lasker plan detailed a three person committee, made up of persons not
financially involved with baseball, to be given absolute power over baseball disputes. Id. at
311-12,
113. See HELYAR, supra note 24, at 5-7.
114. Id
115. Id
116. See Sathy, supra note 50, at 43.
117. SpirN, supra note 90, at 71-72.
118. Id at 72.
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tee assured Landis that he would have this power." 9 However, Landis
would not accept the position until a new National Agreement was
drafted. 20
In December of 1920, Landis met with the baseball owners and their
attorneys to finalize the drafting of the new National Agreement.' 2' Us-
ing John Heylar's initial draft as a starting point, George Wharton Pep-
per, representing the owners, wrote what was to become the Major
League Agreement (MLA). 22 After some discussion over the finer
points of the Agreement, the team owners and Landis approved the doe-
ument.Y3 Part of the Agreement detailed the creation of a Commis-
sioner's Office as well as the powers associated with the position.'24
B. The Commissioner's Power According to the Major League
Agreement of 1921
The Commissioner derived the majority of his authority from Article
I, Section 2 and 3, and Article VII, section 1. Article I, Sections 2 and 3
created the Commissioner's "best interests" power. In particular, Arti-
cle I, Section 2(a) gave the Commissioner the power to investigate a
transaction or practice that he believed could be detrimental to the "best
interests" of baseball. Section 2(b) allowed the Commissioner, after fin-
ishing his investigation, to take whatever preventative, remedial or puni-
tive action he believed appropriate under the circumstances. This meant
he could act against either Major League, any Major League club or any
individual party to the MLA, and against the players.
Section 3 lists courses of punitive action the Commissioner could
take. Included in this list was the right to make a public reprimand, im-
119. Id.
120. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 321.
121. l
122. Joint Meeting of the National League and American League owners and representa-
tives (Nov. 8, 1920) (Tr. at 110-12).
123. Joint Meeting of the National League and American League owners and representa-
tives (Jan. 12, 1921) (Tr. at 1-17). Orally, the owners agreed to give Landis absolute power as
Commissioner. Yet, during the finalizing of the agreement, the owners added a clause to the
Major League Agreement that would allowed Landis to be overruled by an advisory commit-
tee in certain circumstances. Before Landis could leave the room to allow the owners to
discuss the situation, the owners quickly removed the clause, giving Landis absolute power as
Commissioner. I&
124. MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT OF 1921 (1921) [hereinafter MLA]. In establishing the
office of the Commissioner, the owners made it clear that they not only wanted a person to
protect baseball from the influences of gambling, but also to protect the owners themselves.
Joint Meeting of the National League and American League owners and representative (Jan.
12, 1921) (Tr. at 1-17).
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pose a $5,000 fine, temporarily deprive a club of the right of representa-
tion in joint meetings and suspend or permanently declare a player
ineligible to play for any club. It is uncertain why there are two "best
interests" clauses in Article I.
One reading suggests that Section 3 augments the power granted in
Section 2. Section 2 gives the Commissioner the power to investigate
and act. Section 3 seems to allow the Commissioner to act without in-
vestigating conduct "detrimental to the best interests" of baseball. How-
ever, the language of Section 2 seems to prevent the need for any
augmentation from Section 3. This is because the "best interests" clause
in Section 2 is broad enough to contain this reading of authority from
Section 3. Since Section 2 obviates the need for Section 3, Section 3
probably exists for clarification reasons and not as an authorization of
power to the Commissioner.
Another reading suggests that the listed punishments in Section 3
contain the only available forms of punitive actions available to the
Commissioner. If this is the case, then Section 3 acts to limit the broad
powers granted by Section 2.
The interpretation of Article I, Section 2 and 3 has become a major
issue in the interpretation of the Commissioner's "best interests"
power.'25
In addition, the Commissioner derives authority from Article VT I of
the MLA. Article VII, Section 1 dictates that the Major League clubs
are bound by the Commissioner's decisions, including any disciplinary
decisions. Article VII, Section 1 also dictates that the Major League
teams waive their right to recourse to the courts.
While the courts have acknowledged the presence of the waiver of
the right to recourse clause as demonstrative of the intended breadth of
the Commissioner's power, the courts have refused to dismiss lawsuits
brought against a Commissioner based on grounds that the teams have
waived their right to recourse. However, the courts have not reviewed a
Commissioner's decision unless he has exceeded his authority.
C. Commissioner's Power as Intended by the Original Signatories to
the Major League Agreement
While the owners drafted the MLA, they recorded their views on the
substance of the agreement. It is clear that the owners intended to grant
the Commissioner absolute power over all of baseball. While discussing
125. See infra part IV.A.
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the non-recourse provision of Article VII, Barney Dreyfuss, owner of
the Brooklyn Dodgers, stated that ".... we wanted to give [the Commis-
sioner] unlimited power over baseball, and that is what has been carried
out in this section. Power without any review - that is the basis of this
thing.' 1
26
Later, August Herrmann, owner of the Cincinnati Reds, acknowl-
edged a similar sentiment on the powers of the Commissioner when he
stated, "I know the [intention] was to give him [Landis] absolute
power." 127
Although the owners intended to give Landis absolute power, they
were not necessarily pleased with such a prospect. Prior to the final
drafting session, the owners tried to add two limiting clauses to the Com-
missioner's powers.
First, the owners tried to amend a provision that allowed the Com-
missioner to suspend or remove an owner for action "detrimental to the
best interests" of baseball. The owners sought to only grant the Com-
missioner the ability to recommend suspension or removal of an
owner.
1
'
Second, the owners attempted to revise Article II, Section 1 to dic-
tate that the Commissioner's role was limited to that of a tiebreaker in
matters before the Advisory Committee. Before the attempted revision,
the Commissioner had authority to rule on all matters before the Advi-
sory Committee. 129
At the last drafting session, the owners tried to get Landis to agree to
these changes. 3 ° In response, Landis made it clear that he would not
accept the position as Commissioner unless the two provisions were re-
moved. Within a few minutes after Landis made clear his intentions, the
owners removed the two changes to the draft of the MLA.
The fact that the owners deleted the limiting clauses further suggests
that the owners intended to grant the Commissioner absolute power to
rule over baseball.
However, intentions do not necessarily create law. Although the
original owners intended to grant the Commissioner absolute power
126. Joint Meeting of the National League and American League owners and representa-
tives (Jan. 10, 1921) (Tr. at 10).
127. Idm at 12.
128. See supra note 123.
129. Id
130. Id. It appears more likely that the owners were trying to slip the changes by the
Judge. When confronted with the matter, the owners acted like they were as surprised as him
to see the changes in the MLA. Id.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
over baseball, the issue has arisen as to whether they succeeded. This
issue is discussed in Part IV of this Article.
III. CHANGES TO THE COMMISSIONER'S OFFIcE THROUGH
THE YEARS
A. 1945 Amendments
1. Article I, Section (3)
In 1944, Commissioner Landis died, and before the election of a new
Commissioner the team owners amended the MLA, making two changes
limiting the Commissioner's authority.
The first change was the addition of a clause to Article I, Section 3,
which reads:
No Major League rule or other joint action of the two Major
Leagues and no act or procedure taken in compliance with any
such Major League rule or joint action of the two Major Leagues
shall be considered or construed to be detrimental to baseball. If
in the judgment of the Commissioner, any Major League rule or
any joint action of the two Major Leagues becomes in its opera-
tion impracticable or disadvantageous to baseball, either by rea-
son of changed conditions or otherwise, the Commissioner shall
send a notice to the President of each Major League stating his
judgment and the reasons therefor, and noticing such rule or joint
action for reconsideration at the next regular joint meeting of the
Major Leagues, or at the a special joint meeting of the Major
Leagues called by the Commissioner for the purpose of such re-
consideration. At such regular or special joint meeting, such rule
or joint action shall be voted upon as would be done if it were
being initially proposed. During such period of reconsideration,
such rule or joint action of the Leagues shall be in full force and
effect. 131
However, the owners gave the Commissioner the ability to suggest
the removal of a Major League rule. Therefore, the Commissioner, who
could not exercise his "best interests" power in contradiction to an ex-
isting Major League rule, could at the very least try to get the rule re-
moved or changed.
2. Article VII, Section 2
The second change made to the MLA was the deletion of a clause in
Article VII, Section 2 stating that once a Commissioner made a decision,
131. MLA OF 1945 art. I, § 3 (1945).
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the team owners "severally waive such rights of recourse to the courts as
would otherwise have existed in their favor.' 132
B. 1964 Amendments
When Commissioner Ford Frick retired in 1964, he urged the owners
to remove the clause from Article I, Section 3 of the MLA that was
added in 1944, which prevented the Commissioner from exercising his
"best interests" power against an "act or procedure" that complied with
any "Major League rule or joint action of the two Major Leagues.' '1 33
The owners listened to Frick and deleted the aforementioned amend-
ment to Article I, Section 3.13
Furthermore, the team owners reinstated the non-recourse to the
court's provision of Article VII, Section 2 that was deleted in 1944, and
replaced in Article I, Section 2(b) the phrase "detrimental to the best
interests" with the phrase "not in the best interests.' '1 35
C. 1974 Amendments
1. Article VII, Section 1
In 1974, the owners added a new section to Article VII of the MLA.
The section read as follows:
All disputes and controversies related in any way to professional
baseball between clubs (including their officers, directors, em-
ployees and players), other than those whose resolution is ex-
pressly provided for by another means in this Agreement, the
Major League Rules, the constitution of either Major League or
the Basic Agreement between the Major Leagues and the Major
League Baseball Players Association, shall be submitted to the
Commissioner, as Arbitrator who, after hearing, shall have the
sole and exclusive right to decide such disputes and controversies.
The procedure set forth in this section is separate from and shall
not alter or affect the procedure set forth in Article V governing
the role of the Commissioner at Joint Meetings of the two Major
Leagues. 3 6
132. MLA oF 1945 (1945). However, no lawsuits were brought by any owner during
Chandler's or Frick's terms, which lasted from 1944 to 1964.
133. Brief for Appellee at 1-7, Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F.Supp. 906 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (No.
77-2008) (Frick Aff.).
134. Id
135. MLA oF 1965 (1965).
136. MLA oF 1977 art. VII, § 1 (1977).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
The "best interests" power of Article I did not appear to place any
limits on what issues the Commissioner could decide. This new provision
appeared to remove from the Commissioner the ability to use his "best
interests" power when other provisions of the MLA expressly provide
for resolution.
On the other hand, one could argue that the Commissioner's "best
interests" power was not unlimited to begin with and that this new provi-
sion augmented the Commissioner's "best interests" power. No longer
would the Commissioner need to be reacting to an act or procedure in
order to exercise his power. Now, the Commissioner was given power to
settle disputes among members of baseball, as long as there were not
other means provided for in other baseball governing documents. This
argument assumes that the Commissioner did not have the authority
before the change to settle disputes among members of baseball that did
not involve an act or procedure.
D. 1977 Amendments
1. Article I, Section 3
In the 1976 case Atlanta National League Baseball Club v. Kuhn (At-
lanta Braves), Commissioner Kuhn made Atlanta forfeit a draft choice in
the upcoming draft for tampering violations. 137 In response, the court
held that Article I, Section 3 contained the only available list of punish-
ments the Commissioner could dispense in accord with his "best inter-
ests" power.138 The court further added that Kuhn's action was a
punishment and could not be sustained since forfeiture of a draft choice
was not one of the enumerated punishments available to the Commis-
sioner under the MLA.139
In this case, the court did not determine whether this list constricted
the Commissioner's use of his "best interests" power to act in a prevent-
ative or remedial manner, as authorized in Article I, Section 2(b).140
However, the court in Finley v. Kuhn did appear to answer the ques-
tion.141 This court held that the enumerated list of punishments did not
limit the Commissioner's choice of action concerning a preventative or
137. 432 F.Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
138. Id. at 1225.
139. Id. at 1226.
140. Id.
141. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 535-40 (7th Cir. 1978).
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remedial issue.142 Nevertheless, the owners amended the MLA to put
this issue to rest.
First, the owners reinserted the word "punitive" in front of the word
"action" in Article I, Section 3, so that the provision read "[i]n the case
of conduct by Major Leagues, Major League Clubs, officers, employees
or players which is deemed by the Commissioner not to be in the best
interests of Baseball, punitive action by the Commissioner for each of-
fense may include any one or more of the following."'143
The addition of the word "punitive" codifies the aforementioned
holding in Atlanta Braves by declaring the list of enumerated choices of
Article I, Section 3 to be the only available punishments. This addition
is consistent with the holding in Finley, which ruled that the enumerated
choices of Article I, Section 3 did not limit the Commissioner's ability to
take preventative or remedial action. 44
Furthermore, the enumeration of punishment choices in Article I,
Section 3 was increased to include the following provision:
provided that in the case of conduct by a Major League Club
which is deemed by the Commissioner to constitute prohibited
negotiations or dealings with a player respecting employment, pu-
nitive action by the Commissioner may include a fine not to ex-
ceed Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000), and/or loss
of player negotiation selection fights.'4 5
Thus, the owners authorized the Commissioner to dispense a punish-
ment when he believes a team has tampered with another team's player.
A Commissioner no longer had to abide by the decision made by the
court in Atlanta Braves.
E. 1983 and 1984 Amendments
1. Article V, Section 2
Many changes have occurred in baseball since the creation of the
MLA. Issues such as television, radio contracts, and team expansion
were not envisioned by the original signatories to the MLA. The main
reason for establishment of the Commissioner's office was to restore the
public confidence in the moral integrity of baseball. The Commissioner
was to act as an independent party to settle disputes among the members
of baseball. Recognizing the changing nature of baseball, the owners
142. Id
143. MLA OF 1978 art. I, § 3 (1978).
144. See supra note 140.
145. MLA OF 1978, art. I, § 3(e) (1978).
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established a restructuring committee in 1983 to address the complex
business issues that had arisen.
The restructuring committee first amended Article V, Section 2 of
the MLA. Prior to 1983, Article V, Section 2 stated that at joint meet-
ings presided over by the Commissioner, each League would have one
vote on an issue. If the two leagues disagreed on an issue, the Commis-
sioner cast the tiebreaking vote. Once cast, the Commissioner's vote was
not appealable.
In its new form, the section changed the voting procedures at joint
meetings. Instead of each league having one vote, all teams were given a
vote. For most matters, a majority vote would decide an issue. How-
ever, for other issues, different voting requirements decided matters. No
longer did the Commissioner have the tiebreaking vote on joint matters.
The MLA stated that teams recognized that "Major League profes-
sional baseball is a unique association of twenty-six Major League teams,
operating both as individual franchises organized into two leagues, and
doing business collectively as Major League Baseball."'1 6
In addition, the amended section explained that a change was needed
because the old voting "procedures under the Major League Agreement
and Major League Rules d[id] not efficiently serve the need for coopera-
tive decision making among the teams."' 47
2. Article I, Section 2(a)
The restructuring committee made more amendments to the MLA
and the powers of the Commissioner. It decided to alter the purpose of
the Commissioner from an independent party, whose responsibility was
to protect the integrity of baseball, to that of "chief executive officer of
Major League Baseball."' 8 As the CEO of baseball, the Commissioner
was given the right to "be present and to participate in any official meet-
ings of either League, any committee thereof, any Major League com-
mittee, or any other decision making or deliberative body created by the
clubs; and the Commissioner shall receive copies of the minutes or re-
ports, if any, of all such meetings." 49
146. MLA OF 1985 art. V, § 2 (1984).
147. Id.
148. MLA OF 1985 art. I, § 2(a) (1985).
149. Resolution adopted by tthe Major League Clubs (Mar. 3, 1984).
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3. Article I, Sections 3(e) and 3(f)
In addition to making the Commissioner the CEO of baseball, the
MLA was amended to give the Commissioner more power to levy fines
concerning punitive matters. Prior to the changes, a fine could not ex-
ceed $5,000 against a Major League team, and could not exceed $500
against any officer, employee or player. After the changes, a Major
League Team could be fined up to $250,000, and of an officer or em-
ployee, up to $25,000.
In addition to raising the limits of fines, Article I, Section 3 was
amended to include a new punishment available to the Commissioner.
This punishment authorized a Commissioner to take away from a team
"... the benefit of any or all of the Major League Rules, including but
not limited to the denial or transfer of a player selection rights provided
by Major League Rules 4 and 5. "150 The Commissioner could now im-
plement a very broad range of punishments.
4. Article I, Section 7
The next change to the MLA was an amendment to the Commis-
sioner hiring provision of Article I, Section 7. Section 7 details voting
procedures among the teams concerning the election and re-election of a
Commissioner. Prior to the changes, a three-fourths vote per League of
all teams was required in order for a candidate to become Commis-
sioner. Additionally, a three-fourths vote per League was required by
the teams in order for a Commissioner to be re-elected. After the
amendment, all that was required for a person to be elected Commis-
sioner was a three-fourths vote of all the Major League teams (at least
five in each League). Furthermore, for a Commissioner to remain in
office for another term, all that was needed was a majority vote (at least
five per league) of the teams.
Bowie Kuhn was Commissioner for 20 years and during that time, he
made decisions that went against one team's interest or another. The
more decisions he made, the more enemies he made. Each time he
sought re-election, he found it more difficult to get a three-fourths vote
in his favor. Recognizing that the Commissioner should be removed as
much as possible from politics, the teams implemented this aforemen-
tioned change. No longer could four teams prevent the re-election of a
Commissioner. Rather, a majority of the teams was needed to keep a
Commissioner from being re-elected.
150. MLA oF 1985 art. I, § 3(f) (1985).
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5. Article VII, Section 2
The last change made by the restructuring committee was to amend
Article VII, Section 2 of the MLA. This is the section that contained the
non-recourse to the court provision that was removed from the MLA in
1944. The first part of the new Article VII, Section 2 detailed the intent
of the owners in having a non-recourse to the court provision by stating
that:
[t]he Major Leagues and their constituent clubs recognize that it
is in the best interests of Baseball that all actions taken by the
Commissioner under the authority of this Agreement, including
but not limited to Article I, Section 2 and 3 and this Article VII,
be accepted and complied with by the Leagues and clubs...ls5
Up to this point the courts greatly discussed the non-recourse provi-
sion in the cases before them. If there was any doubt before, this provi-
sion now clearly expressed that the owners did not want an authorized
decision made by the Commissioner to be questioned in a court of law.
In addition, the owners amended the language of the non-recourse
provision to read "severally agree to be finally and unappealably bound
by such actions and severally waive such right of recourse to the courts as
would otherwise have existed in their favor."'
1 52
Finally, the owners added a provision at the end of Article VII, Sec-
tion 2 that gave the Commissioner the power to force a noncomplying
team to pay the cost of such noncompliance. Additionally, the provision
provided that the Commissioner still had other available remedies set
forth in the MLA. The provision reads as follows:
In the event of noncompliance by any League or club, or any of-
ficer or employee thereof, with any action of the Commissioner,
and in addition to any other remedy which may be available to
the Commissioner, the Commissioner may direct that the costs,
including attorneys' fees, to the Office of the Commissioner of
any court proceeding involving such action, whether in defense or
enforcement thereof, be reimbursed to the Office of Commis-
sioner by such non-complying League or club. Nothing herein
shall be construed to limit any rights of indemnity which the ma-
jor Leagues or their constituent clubs may have against any
club.153
151. MLA oF 1985 art. VII, § 2 (1985).
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id.
[Vol. 7:211
1996] THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSIONER IN BASEBALL 231
F. 1994 Amendments
1. Article I, Section 2(a) and (5)
In 1992, after a turbulent few years as Commissioner, Fay Vincent
resigned his position. He no longer had the support of the owners and
thus could not effectively serve as Commissioner. Following his resigna-
tion, the owners sought to amend the MLA in order to resolve some of
the issues they felt were raised during Vincent's term.
First, the owners clarified the Commissioner's role in labor negotia-
tions.154 A new Section 5 was added to Article I stating that "notwith-
standing the provisions of Sections 2 and 4, above, the powers of the
Commissioner to act in the best interests of Baseball shall be inapplica-
ble to any matter relating to a subject of collective bargaining between
the Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players Association."' 155
Additionally, in Section 2(a) of Article I, the owners designated that
the Commissioner was now responsible for serving as the Chairman of
the Player Relations Committee (PRC) or choosing the Chairman. Ad-
ditionally, the section stated that the Commissioner would also serve as
Chairman of "such other committees as the Major League Clubs shall
from time to time determine by resolution." '156
The purpose of the Section 5 amendment was to prevent a Commis-
sioner from using his "best interests" power to circumvent the PRC's
handling of labor negotiations. The following actions taken by Bowie
Kuhn when he was Commissioner warranted such changes.
In 1976, the PRC decided to lock out the players from starting the
baseball season until a better labor deal could be made. As the lock out
progressed, the owners were getting closer to a favorable labor deal.
Although Commissioner Kuhn was not involved in any of the labor ne-
gotiations, he wanted the lockout over as soon as possible. Using his
"best interests" power, Kuhn forced the PRC and the owners to stop the
lockout. Prior to the 1994 amendment of Section 5, a Commissioner was
authorized to take such action.
Following the 1994 amendment to Section 5, the above situation
could not happen. However, the owners, as evidenced by the amend-
154. During the last major labor negotiations between the Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA) and the Players Relation Committee (PRC) before Commissioner Vin-
cent's resignation, many owners complained that the Commissioner compelled the owners to
follow a course that the majority did not want to take. HELYAR, supra note 24, at 412-24.
155. MLA OF 1994 art. I, § 5 (1994).
156. Id at § 2(a). The PRC is a committee that handles the labor negotiations for the
ovmers -with the MLBPA.
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ments in Section 2(a), intended the Commissioner to head the PRC and
be involved with labor negotiations. As head of the PRC, the Commis-
sioner chooses who will assist him in labor negotiations. Additionally, as
head of the PRC, he chooses what labor negotiation matters will be
voted on by the owners. Thus, in the above scenario, a Commissioner
would be less likely to use his "best interests" power because he has
substantial control over the labor negotiations and dictates what the
owners can vote on.
At first glance it appears that the owners decreased the powers of the
Commissioner, but they have actually increased them. It is unwise for a
Commissioner, who has not been involved in labor negotiations between
the PRC and the MLBPA, to use his "best interests" power to circum-
vent the PRC's negotiation efforts. It is unwise because the Commis-
sioner could be fired for such action or fail to be re-elected. 157 At the
very least he would anger many owners and experience difficulty in the
re-election process.
On the other hand, the amendments have made the Commissioner
the Chairman of the PRC. As Chairman he has much control over the
direction of the negotiations with less fear of getting fired. He is less
tempted to use his "best interests" power because he leads the PRC.
2. Article I, Section 4
While Vincent was Commissioner, he used his "best interest" power
to attempt to re-align the National League. Prior to this attempt, the
Chicago Cubs, using a veto provision in the National League Constitu-
tion, had blocked all previous attempts at National League realignment.
After Vincent's decision, the Cubs sued him, claiming he was not author-
ized to use his "best interests" clause in contravention of existing Major
League rules.'58
The Cubs got an injunction against Vincent, but before the case was
heard on appeal, Vincent resigned. Because the case was dropped, the
legal issue concerning the breadth of the "best interests" power was not
resolved.
157. Even though the amendments of 1985, art. I, § 7 dictate that a Commissioner needs
only an affirmative majority vote (with at least five votes per league) to be re-elected, a Com-
missioner who acts as Kuhn did concerning a lock-out could experience difficulty in garnering
a majority vote for re-election.
158. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Vincent, No. 92 c4398 (N.D. Ill. 1992), appeal
docketed, No. 92-2721 (7th Cir. July 23, 1992).
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In an attempt to resolve the issue of whether the Commissioner can
use his "best interests" power in contravention to existing Major League
rules, the teams subsequently amended what is now Article I, Section 4
of the current MLA. The section reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2, above, the Commis-
sioner shall take no action in the best interests of Baseball that (i)
requires the Clubs to take, or to refrain from taking, joint League
action (by vote, agreement or otherwise) on any of the matters
requiring a vote of the Clubs at a Joint Major League Meeting
that are set forth in Article I, Section 9 or in Article V, Section
2(b) or (c), or (ii) requires the member Clubs of either League to
take, or to refrain from taking, League action (by vote, agreement
or otherwise), on any matter to be voted upon by Member Clubs
of the League pursuant to their League Constitution; provided,
however, that nothing in this Section 4 shall limit the Commis-
sioner's authority to act on any matter that involves the integrity
of, or public confidence in, the national game of Baseball.
Under this new section, the Commissioner is not authorized to use
his "best interests" power to take an action that the Major League Clubs
could not accomplish otherwise, unless they voted or refrained from vot-
ing at a Joint Major League Meeting or League Meeting concerning its
Constitution on the matter. However, there is an exception if the matter
involves the integrity or public confidence of baseball.
This section does not limit the Commissioner's use of his "best inter-
ests" power, but rather increases such use. Before the amendment, it
was unclear whether the Commissioner could use his "best interests"
power in the ways detailed in the new Section 4 of the MLA. Now, he
can use his "best interests" power in all the ways detailed in Section 4,
except in areas of labor, provided he can show that the integrity or pub-
lic confidence of baseball is at stake. Baseball is a public business and,
arguably, any matter can be characterized by a Commissioner as a public
confidence or integrity issue. While the Commissioner may not always
be correct in such an assertion, the courts have shown themselves very
reluctant to review a Commissioner's decision.
Therefore, the clause does not really limit the Commissioner's "best
interests" power, but allows him broader use of this power, as long as he
claims to be protecting the integrity or public confidence of baseball.
3. Article I, Section 9
In addition to adding two sections to Article I, the owners renamed
Section 7 as Section 9 and added new language. The first section states
that if the Commissioner is incapacitated at any time, the Executive
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Council will perform his duties. It further adds that incapacity is to be
determined by the Commissioner or the Executive Council. Finally, a
three-fourths majority of the teams (with at least five teams in each
League) can elect a temporary Commissioner for a period of less than
three years.
Yet, what criteria would the Executive Committee use to determine
whether the Commissioner is incapacitated? Even if the Executive
Committee had stringent standards for making this determination, there
is a possibility that a Commissioner could be removed regardless of his
objections.
4. Article I, Section 10
Lastly, Section 10 has been created to deal with the election of
League Presidents. The section requires a majority vote of the clubs of
the "affected League, together with the approval of the Commissioner
... )159 in order for the election or re-election of a League President.
In the past the Commissioner did not have a vote on the election of
League Presidents. Now, the Commissioner has the ability to veto any
candidate for League President.
5. Article V, Section 2(e)
Article V, Section 2(e) states that "[a]Ul League-specific matters shall
be decided by a vote of the Member Clubs of such League pursuant to
their League Constitution.' 60
One purpose of this section is to limit the power of the Commis-
sioner. The provision accomplishes this by not permitting the Commis-
sioner to resolve matters pertaining to a specific League. However, it is
clear from the revised Article I, Section 4 that if the integrity or public
confidence of baseball is at stake, the Commissioner can utilize his "best
interests" power to settle the matter.
6. Article VII, Section 1
One of the issues in the Chicago Cubs case was whether Article VII,
Section 1 limited or augmented the Commissioner's use of his "best in-
terests" power. The owners amended this section to dictate that the
Commissioner's "best interests" power is not affected by the rest of the
section. In other words, an issue will not be submitted to the Commis-
159. MLA oF 1994 art. I, § 10 (1994).
160. MLA oF 1994 art. V, § 2(e) (1994).
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sioner for arbitration if the issue's resolution is expressly provided for by
other means. However, the Commissioner can use his "best interests"
power to resolve an issue that he has not been asked to arbitrate.
G. Results of the Amendments
There have been many changes to the office of the Commissioner.
The first Commissioner served as the protector of baseball. His role was
to clean up baseball and protect the moral integrity of the game. Over
the years, however, the role of the Commissioner has dramatically
changed.
The Commissioner does not have the absolute power that he once
appeared to have. His responsibilities have increased, but he no longer
has absolute power over any issue he is involved in.
The Commissioner is not the umpire of baseball anymore, but rather
the CEO of baseball. He no longer protects the status quo, but leads the
business into the future. It takes a more dynamic person to serve as
Commissioner now than it did 73 years ago.
When issues such as labor negotiations, television contracts and ex-
pansion first arose, the owners tried to handle these issues among them-
selves and not rely on the Commissioner. Now, the owners intend the
Commissioner to be involved in these issues. Except for some restric-
tions on his actions toward the players, the Commissioner cannot do
anything that Commissioner Landis could once do. Yet, there are some
things that the Commissioner today can accomplish that could not be
accomplished by Commissioner Landis.
Because the Commissioner has not lost any responsibility and has
been given input into the overall structure of baseball, the Commissioner
of professional baseball has more power today than he did in the past.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE "BEST INTEREsTS" POWER OF
THE MLA
A. Judicial Interpretation
1. Milwaukee American Ass'n v. Landis
In 1930, Judge Landis, using the "best interests" power, refused to
allow the St. Louis Browns to assign a player's contract to a minor
league team.161 In addition, Landis declared the player a free agent.' 62
161. Milwaukee Am. Ass'n. v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D.Ill. 1931), appeal dismissed, 61
F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1931). Art. I, § 2(a) of the MLA of 1921 (which contains the "Best Inter-
est" clause) states that the Commissioner has the power:
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Landis stated that Phil Ball, the owner of the St. Louis Browns, violated
a rule which forbid a major league team from keeping a player it con-
trolled with a minor league team for more than two seasons without giv-
ing other major league teams the option of claiming the player's
services.' 63 The St. Louis Browns and Milwaukee of the American As-
sociation sued to enjoin Landis from disapproving the option contract
between St. Louis and Milwaukee.164
The court upheld Landis's use of the "best interests" power in disap-
proving the assignment. The court explained that as Commissioner,
Landis had "all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute despot and all
the disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater familias.' 165 In acting as
this despot, the court emphasized that the Commissioner had "an almost
unlimited discretion in the determination of whether or not a certain
state of facts creates a situation detrimental to the national game of
baseball."' 66
The plaintiffs argued that the meaning of "conduct detrimental to
baseball" should be limited to actions specifically prohibited under the
Major League Agreement. 67 However, the court answered this argu-
ment by stating:
the provisions are so unlimited in character that we can conclude
only that the parties did not intend so to limit the meaning of
conduct detrimental to baseball, but intended to vest in the[Cjommissioner jurisdiction to prevent any conduct destructive of
the aims of the code. Apparently it was the intent of the parties
to make the commissioner an arbiter, whose decisions... made
relating to the purpose of the organization and all conduct detri-
mental thereto, should be absolutely binding.'68
[T]o investigate, either upon complaint or upon his own initiative, any act, transaction
or practice charged, alleged or suspected to be detrimental to the best interests of the
National Game of Baseball; with authority to summon persons and to order the pro-
duction of documents; and, in case of refusal to appear or produce, to impose such
penalties as are hereinafter provided.
162. Id. at 299. The player's name was Fred Bennett. See SPn'M, supra note 90, at 198.
163. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Vincent, No. 92 c4398, at 303. Phil Ball
owned the St. Louis Browns and several minor league teams. See SpiNK, supra note 90, at 198.
Landis argued that because Ball owned the minor league teams that were purchasing Ben-
nett's contract, St. Louis had controlled him for longer than the allowed two year period. Id.
164. See Milwaukee Am. Ass'n, 49 F.2d at 299.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 303.
167. Id at 302.
168. Id
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Additionally, the Plaintiffs argued that Landis was not authorized to
make a player a free agent.169 The court responded that it was immate-
rial whether the MLA specifically authorized the Commissioner to make
a player a free agent because the rules granted to the Commissioner "ju-
risdiction to refuse to approve... assignment by St. Louis to Milwaukee,
and to declare [the player] absolved from the burdens of the same and of
his contract with St. Louis."'170 In other words, the Commissioner could
refuse the assignment of the player and nullify his contract, and the
player would be a free agent.
Finally, the two teams argued that the Major League Agreement's
issuance of broad jurisdiction to the Commissioner was against public
policy because it attempted to deprive the court of its jurisdiction.' 7'
The court responded that while it is common that "[a]n agreement to
arbitrate a controverted question and to deprive all courts of jurisdic-
tion, so long as in executory form," is void, "an actual submission to an
arbiter or umpire in good faith is proper, and decision under same is
binding unless it is unsupported by evidence, or unless the decision is
upon some basis without legal foundation or beyond legal
recognition.' 1 72
2. Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn
A dispute which arose in 1976 brought up the issue of a Commis-
sioner's ability to dispense punishment. 73 The team owners and the
players had recently signed a new collective bargaining agreement which
established free agency.' 74 Bowie Kuhn, the Commissioner of Baseball
at the time, repeatedly warned team owners not to negotiate with or
make public comments about other teams' players until the players were
free agents. 75 Disregarding Kuhn's warnings, Ted Turner, the owner of
the Atlanta Braves, made public statements about his team having inter-
est in a potential free agent from another team.176 Kuhn subsequently
suspended Turner from being involved in his team's operations for one
year.177 In addition, Kuhn stripped the Braves of its first round draft
169. Id.
170. 1&
171. Id. at 303.
172. Id
173. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F.Supp. 1213 (1977).
174. Id at 1215.
175. Id. at 1215-17.
176. 1L at 1217.
177. L
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pick in the next baseball draft.178 Then, the Atlanta Braves sued to en-
join Kuhn from carrying out his punishments.179
The federal district court upheld Kuhn's authority to discipline Tur-
ner and the Braves for their actions.'80 However, the court did not allow
Kuhn to take away a draft choice from the Braves.'"' The court ex-
plained that despite the existence of a separate collective bargaining
agreement (Basic Agreement) between the players and the owners con-
cerning free agency, the Commissioner was authorized by his "best inter-
ests" power to regulate the process."s The court explained that the
Basic Agreement only adjusted the powers of the Commissioner to the
extent needed to prevent the Commissioner from infringing on the rights
granted to the parties by the agreement.8 3 Additionally, the court ex-
plained that even though an arbitration panel existed for settling collec-
tive bargaining disputes, the Commissioner's ability to use his "best
interests" power were not limited by the provision establishing the
panel. 8 4
The Braves argued that the Commissioner could not issue directives
because his "rulemaking authority [wa]s limited to procedural rules"
under Article I, Section 2(d) of the MLA. 8 -5 In other words, the Braves
complained that the Commissioner could not make rules pertaining to
the Basic Agreement. The court responded that Kuhn's directives were
nothing more than "advance notice as to what acts will constitute forbid-
den conduct."' 8 6 Additionally, the court held that even though there al-
ready existed tampering provisions in the Basic Agreement, Kuhn's
directives, or advance notices pertaining to tampering, were valid be-
cause the directives were "not inconsistent" with the Basic Agreement
provisions. 7
Turner and the Braves also argued that even if the Commissioner had
the authority to issue the directives, Kuhn's decision on the directives
and discipline of Turner was "contrary to the weight of the evidence and
178. 1&
179. Id at 1218.
180. Id. at 1226.
181. Id.
182. I& at 1220.
183. Id
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1221 (forbidden conduct meaning conduct not in the "best interests" of
baseball).
187. Id.
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that he abused his discretion."'" In response to Turner's request to look
into Kuhn's decision-making process, the court responded "[v]hat con-
duct is 'not in the best interests of baseball' is, of course, a question
which addresses itself to the Commissioner, not this court."1" 9
On the other hand, the court held that the language of the MLA
implies that the list of sanctions in Article I, section 3 is the exclusive
form of punitive sanctions available to the Commissioner. 190 In addi-
tion, the court ruled that deprivation of a draft choice constituted a puni-
tive sanction.' 9 ' Because deprivation of a draft choice was not one of
the enumerated sanctions under Article I, Section 3, the court held that
the Commissioner could not enforce such a punishment.'9' The court
suggested that for remedial or preventive actions, the Commissioner was
not limited to the sanctions listed in Article I, Section 3.193
3. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn
A labor dispute between the owners and players culminated in the
signing of a new Basic Agreement which created a free agency system. 94
Charles Finley, the owner of the Oakland Athletics, decided that he did
not want to lose players to free agency for nothing.19 The day before
the trading deadline, Finley sold outfielder Joe Rudi and relief pitcher
Rollie Fingers to the Boston Red Sox in exchange for $1 million dollars
each."'96 Soon thereafter, Finley sold Vida Blue to the New York
Yankees for $1.5 million dollars. 97 Upon hearing the news, Commis-
sioner Kuhn was furious. Using the "best interests" clause of Article I,
Section 2, Kuhn disapproved the assignments. 98 Finley sued the Com-
missioner, claiming Kuhn had no authority to disapprove the assign-
ments because no Major League rules were broken and no moral
188. Id. at 1222.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1225.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1225-26.
194. Id at 1215.
195. See HELYAR, supra note 24, at 192. Finley felt that when the season ended, the
players on his team who were to become free agents would not remain with the team. Since
there was little compensation for losing a free agent, Finley decided to get some value for
these players. He decided to try and sell them for cash to the highest bidder. Id at 183-88.
196. Id. at 185-86. After the trading deadline, a team cannot sell the contracts of a player
without offering the player to all other teams in the League, in inverse order of their standing,
at the stipulated waiver price of $20,000. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 535-40.
197. HELYAR, supra note 24, at 186.
198. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 535-40.
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turpitude was involved.199 Additionally, Finley claimed that Kuhn's ac-
tions were "arbitrary and capricious. ' 200
The trial court ruled in favor of the Commissioner, and on appeal,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
The court reasoned that the "best interests" power gave the Commis-
sioner broad power and that his authority to act under his preventive
and remedial powers was not limited by the Article I, Section 3 list of
punitive sanctions.201
In determining that the Commissioner possessed broad power, the
Court stated certain relevant factors that went into its decision:
In assessing the measure and extent of the Commissioner's power
and authority, consideration must be given to the circumstances
attending the creation of the office of Commissioner, the lan-
guage employed by the parties in drafting their contractual under-
standing, changes and amendments adopted from time to time,
and the interpretation given by the parties to their contractual
language throughout the period of its existence.202
In particular, the court looked at the amendments to Article I, Section 2
of 1944 and 1964 and stated "[w]hen professional baseball intended to
place limitations upon the Commissioner's powers, it knew how to do
SO."i203
Regardless, Finley argued that the Commissioner did not follow
proper procedures when he made his rulings.204 Specifically, Finley
claimed that Kuhn did not give reasonable notice that he was going to
take such an "abrupt departure from well-established assignment
practice[s]. ' '20 5
The Court responded:
that anyone becoming a signatory to the Major League Agree-
ment was put on ample notice that the action ultimately taken by
the Commissioner was not only possible but probable. The action
was neither an "abrupt departure" nor a "change of policy" in
view of the contemporaneous developments taking place in the
reserve system, over which the Commissioner had little or no con-
trol . .206
199. Id. at 531.
200. Id.
201. lit at 535.
202. Id. at 532.
203. Ma. at 537.
204. Id. at 536.
205. Id (citation omitted).
206. Id at 540.
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Furthermore, the court stated that if the Commissioner acted in good
faith, it should not review the validity of his actions. In support of this
view, the court reasoned that:
baseball cannot be analogized to any other business or even to
any other sport or entertainment. Baseball's relation to the fed-
eral anti-trust laws has been characterized by the Supreme Court
as an "exception," an "anomaly" and an "aberration." Baseball's
management through a commissioner is equally an exception,
anomaly and aberration... In no other sport or business is there
quite the same system, created for quite the same reasons and
with quite the same underlying policies. Standards such as the
best interests of baseball, the interests of the morale of the play-
ers and the honor of the game... are not necessarily familiar to
courts and obviously require some expertise in their application.
While it is true that professional baseball selected as its first Com-
missioner a federal judge, it intended only him and not the judici-
ary as a whole to be its umpire and governor. 0 7
4. Rose v. Giamatti
Giamatti, using his investigative powers of Article I, Section 2, hired
a special prosecutor to investigate allegations that Pete Rose was gam-
bling on baseball.208 After the special prosecutor finished his investiga-
tion, Giamatti scheduled a hearing to discuss the investigation. 0 9
Before the date came to pass, Rose sued Giamatti to enjoin him from
holding the hearing.210 Rose claimed that Giamatti had prejudged the
case and had not followed the procedural guidelines of Article I, Section
2(e) in carrying out the investigation.21
The Court of Common Pleas of Ohio granted Rose a temporary re-
straining order. 2  Giamatti than attempted to have the case heard in a
federal district court.2 13 A federal district court accepted jurisdiction to
hear the case.214 The case was eventually settled out of court.215
207. Id at 537 (citations omitted).
208. See HELYAR, supra note 24, at 402; Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F.Supp. 906 (S.D. Ohio
1989).
209. Id. at 403.
210. Id.
211. Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F.Supp. at 909. Art I, § 2(e) gives the Commissioner the
power to create procedural rules which he must follow in carrying out his duties. MLA oF
1995 art. I, § 2(e) (1995).
212. Rose v. Giamatti, No. A8905178, 1989 Ohio Misc. Lexis 1 (Ct. C.P. June 25, 1989).
213. See Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F.Supp. at 909.
214. Id. at 923-24.
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Significantly, the federal court did make a statement concerning the
powers of the Commissioner:
[I]t is clear that with regard to disciplinary matters, the major
league baseball clubs have made the Commissioner totally in-
dependent of their control. Under the Major League Agreement,
the Commissioner's status with respect to disciplinary matters is
analogous to that of an independent contractor, a person em-
ployed by Major League Baseball to act as an arbitrator and
judge independent of any control by the members of Major
League Baseball.2 16
5. Chicago National League Ball Club. Inc. v. Vincent
On March 4, 1992, all the National League Teams, except the New
York Mets and the Chicago Cubs, voted in favor of division realign-
ment.2 17 However, utilizing a veto provision in the National League
Constitution, the Chicago Cubs prevented the realignment.
Nevertheless, Commissioner Fay Vincent ordered the realignment,
citing his "best interests" power as authority. The Cubs sought an injunc-
tion preventing Vincent from transferring the Cubs into a different divi-
sion. The Cubs argued that the Commissioner had exceeded the powers
granted to him under the MLA.
Specifically, the Cubs argued that the Commissioner was not author-
ized to act as arbitrator under Article V on the realignment issue be-
cause there was another express means for resolution, specifically the
voting provisions in the National League Constitution. Vincent argued
that he was not acting as arbitrator and, thus, was not bound by Article
V's language. Rather, he claimed authority to act under the "best inter-
ests" power.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted
the preliminary injunction against Vincent. Judge Conlan, who heard the
motion, stated that "the Commissioner's authority to investigate 'Acts,'
'transactions' and 'practices' and to determine and take 'preventative,
remedial or punitive action' does not encompass restructuring the divi-
sions of the National League. There has been no conduct [or miscon-
duct] for the Commissioner to investigate, punish or remedy under
Article I.1'218
215. Rose agreed to accept the punishments set out by Giamatti, and, thus, the case was
dropped.
216. Id. at 919.
217. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Vincent, No. 92 c4398 (N.D. Il. 1992).
218. Id.
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In addition, Judge Conlan stated that the veto exercised by the Cubs
was a continuation of traditional divisional placements as seen in the
National League Constitution.
Before the appeal could be heard, Vincent resigned and the matter of
division realignment was dropped by the rest of the National League
teams.
B. Broad Interpretation
1. Uniqueness of the Game of Baseball and the Commissioner's
Management Role
Professional baseball has characteristics unlike any other business. In
most businesses, a company benefits when its competitors go bankrupt.
However, a baseball team cannot survive if it has no competitlion. Addi-
tionally, professional baseball teams derive a majority of their income
from television, licensing and other joint activities. Finally, due to salary
arbitration, a baseball team must pay its employees the same amount of
money as its competitors pay their employees, even if its competitors do
not desire a particular employee's services.
In this unique business, the Commissioner has unique management
responsibilities that differ greatly from that of other Chief Executive Of-
ficers. For example, a CEO of a company can fire its employees, whereas
the Commissioner of Baseball has little say over who is a professional
ballplayer.
Because the Commissioner has unique responsibilities of running a
unique business, a greater amount of latitude should be given to the
Commissioner's use of his authority than would otherwise be given a
CEO of a normal business association.
The Supreme Court has supported the unique nature of the Com-
misssioner's role. The Supreme Court upheld baseball's antitrust ex-
emption on the grounds that baseball has "unique characteristics and
needs. 219
In Finley, the court expressed this same view in its response to the
Plaintiff's argument that the Commissioner's actions must follow due
process. 220 Specifically, the court stated that:
baseball cannot be analogized to any other business or even to
any other sport or entertainment. Baseball's relation to the fed-
219. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,282 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953). See also Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
220. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 537 (7th Cir. 1978).
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eral antitrust laws has been characterized by the Supreme Court
as an "exception," and "anomaly" and an "aberration." Base-
ball's management through a commissioner is equally an excep-
tion, anomaly and aberration...221
2. The Complexity of Baseball Culture
In addition, baseball has a unique culture that is difficult to govern.
Only in baseball is a leader's authority based on a "best interests" con-
cept. One could argue that only a person experienced with the culture
can truly understand the nuances of governing baseball. The Commis-
sioner is believed to have this special experience. Therefore, it follows
that the Commissioner should be given wide latitude in governing - his
interpretation of a rule like the 'best interests" power should be
respected because he is in the best position to interpret such a rule.
In Finley, the court discussed the unique nature of baseball culture,
the difficulty of interpreting parts of the Major League Agreement, and
the need for an expert to interpret this document.2" Specifically, the
court stated "[s]tandards such as the best interests of baseball, the inter-
ests of the morale of the players and the honor of the game, or 'sports-
manship which accepts the umpire's decision without complaint,' are not
necessarily familiar to courts and obviously require some expertise in
their application." 23
The Finley court further explained its reluctance to examine the deci-
sions of a Commissioner because doing so "would involve the courts in
not only interpreting often complex rules of baseball to determine if they
were violated but also, as noted in the Landis case, the 'intent of the
[baseball] code,' an even more complicated and subjective task. ' '22
The Finley court's approach of not reviewing the content of the Com-
missioner's decision was also the approach taken in the Atlanta Braves
case. The Atlanta Braves court stated "[w]hat conduct is 'not in the best
interests of baseball' is, of course, a question which addresses itself to the
Commissioner, not this court. 225
221. IM. at 537 (citations omitted).
222, Id
223. Id.
224. Id at 539.
225. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F.Supp. 1213, 1222 (1977).
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3. Breadth of the "Best Interests" Clause and the Absence of
Express Limitation
The scope of the "best interests" clause is broad on its face and the
nonexistence of any limiting clauses in the MLA suggests that the Com-
missioner has broad powers under the clause. In other words, a literal
interpretation of the MLA indicates that there should be a broad read-
ing of the Commissioner's powers, absent any expressly limiting
language.
In Finley, the court stated that one of the main factors in deciphering
a contract's meaning is the language used by the parties in the con-
tract. 26 Additionally, the court in Milwaukee American stated that the
MLA "disclose[s] clear intent upon the part of the parties to endow the
commissioner with all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute despot
and all the disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater familias." 2 2 7
Concerning the "best interests" power of the Commissioner, the
court in Milwaukee American stated that "the provisions are so unlim-
ited in character that we can conclude only that the parties did not in-
tend so to limit the meaning of conduct detrimental to baseball..."I
However, the language of Article I, Section 2 in the Milwaukee
American case is different than the current language. In Milwaukee
American, the clause contained the phrase "detrimental to the best inter-
ests" of Major League baseball, whereas the current provision uses the
language "not in the best interests" of Major League baseball.229
The court in Atlanta Braves similarly interpreted the current "best
interests" clause to be read broadly when it stated that "[t]he Commis-
sioner has general authority, without rules or directives, to punish both
clubs and/or personnel for any act or conduct which, in his judgment, is
'not in the best interests of baseball' within the meaning of the Major
League Agreement."3 0
In Finley, the court stated that "[t]he Commissioner has been given
broad power in unambiguous language. . ."231 The court further dis-
cussed the amendments made by the Major League owners when Com-
missioner Landis died in 1944.232 In 1914, the MLA was amended to
226. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1978).
227. Milwaukee Am. Ass'n. v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D.Ill. 1931), appeal dismissed,
61 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1931).
228. Id. at 302.
229. MLA op 1921 art. I, § 2 (1921); MLA oF 1995 art. I, § 2 (1995).
230. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F.Supp. 1213, 1222 (1977).
231. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1978).
232. Id.
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include a limiting clause to the "best interests" power that stated "[n]o
Major League rule or other joint action of the two Major Leagues and
no act or procedure taken in compliance with any such Major League
rule or joint action of the two Major Leagues shall be considered or con-
strued to be detrimental to baseball. 233
The Finley court concluded that these amendments showed that the
owners knew how to limit the powers of the Commissioner. 234 The court
added that the subsequent removal of this amendment was evidence of
the owners intentions to grant the Commissioner broad use of his "best
interests" power.235 The Court further acknowledged that existence of
the covenant not to sue was proof of the intentions of the owners to
provide the Commissioner with broad power. 36
4. Intentions of the Original Signatories to the MLA
In 1921, the team owners drafted the Major League Agreement. As
discussed earlier, during the drafting process and final signing of the con-
tract, the owners recorded most of the discussions that occurred between
each other and Landis. These transcripts showed that the original signa-
tories expected the Commissioner to have absolute authority.237
In particular, during the final drafting session, the owners added a
clause that would have prevented the Commissioner from suspending or
removing a club or league official or employee. Instead, the clause only
authorized the Commissioner to recommend suspension or removal of
aforementioned parties. Landis's response made it clear, however, that
he would not accept the position if the clause was not removed from the
contract:
There had grown up in baseball certain evils which were not lim-
ited to bad baseball players; that men who never handled the ball
but men who controlled ball clubs in the past have been guilty of
various offenses, and that you gentlemen recognized that fact and
you had made up your minds the time had come for a situation to
be created where somebody would be given authority, if I may
[p]ut it brutally, to save you from yourselves ... Accordingly, we
met at New York... and we drew up a tentative agreement for
233. MLA OF 1945 (1945).
234. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 537.
235. Id. at 539.
236. Id. at 543.
237. Joint Meeting of the National League and American League owners and representa-
tives (Jan. 12, 1921) (7r. at 1-17).
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the Major Leagues, and it provided for authority to be exercised
by the Commissioner...
[Y]ou gentlemen had finally concluded that there should be de-
veloped by the spoken word, the written word, a commission hav-
ing power to deal with whatever evil came up in your game."8
Needless to say, the clause was withdrawn and the owners believed
they were giving Landis the powers he requested. Some people would
argue that weight should be given to the original intentions of the par-
ties. The court in Finley acknowledged this view when it stated that
"consideration must be given to the circumstances attending the creation
of the office of Commissioner. '"2 39
5. Prior Practices That Have Gone Unchallenged
Another, less plausible argument for granting the Commissioner
broad power under the "best interests" clause is the past exercise of
power by Commissioners that have gone unchallenged. In Finley. the
court stated that one of the factors in interpreting the breadth of the
Commissioner's powers was "the interpretation given by the parties to
their contractual language throughout the period of its existence."24
The court in Finley acknowledged that in many instances, both Lan-
dis and Kuhn had exercised their "best interests" power in matters not
related to moral turpitude or violations of the Major League Rules. The
court further acknowledged that both men had "taken broad preventive
or remedial action with respect to assignments of player contracts."24'
However, in the same case, two of the three judges stressed that they
did not give any particular weight to what the current parties' beliefs
were concerning the original intent of the signatories to the MLA.242
Additionally, the court in Atlanta Braves, responding to cited examples
when the Commissioner's actions went unchallenged, stated that the fact
that "the Commissioner's authority in those cases went unchallenged
does not persuade this court of the Commissioner's unlimited punitive
powers in light of contractual language and established rules of construc-
tion to the contrary. '2 43
238. See supra note 124.
239. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 532.
240. Id.
241. Id at 537.
242. Id at 545-46.
243. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F.Supp. 1213, 1226 (1977).
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C. Narrow Interpretation
1. Language Inferred From the MLA
On the other hand, there are a few arguments that can be raised
against having a broad interpretation of the Commissioner's "best inter-
ests" power. One argument is that the language of the clause constrains
itself. Article I, Section 2(b) reads as follows: "any act, transaction or
practice charged, alleged or suspected to be not in the best interest of
baseball.. .."I
It can be argued that the language of the clause expressly limits the
Commissioner to negative uses of his "best interests" power. In other
words, the argument is that the Commissioner can only use his "best
interests" power when something specific has occurred or is about to
occur.
Recently, the district court in Chicago Cubs took this viewpoint and
enjoined Commissioner Vincent from exercising his "best interests"
power to order divisional realignment in the National League.2 4 5 Specif-
ically, Judge Conlon stated:
Giving the language of Article I its common sense and ordinary
meaning, the Commissioner's authority to investigate "acts,"
"transactions" and "practices" and to determine and take "pre-
ventive, remedial or punitive action" does not encompass restruc-
turing the divisions of the National League. There has been no
conduct [or misconduct] for the Commissioner to investigate,
punish or remedy under Article 1.246
According to this reasoning, the ordinary meaning of the clause does
not grant the Commissioner power to take affirmative actions, such as
ordering realignment. However, if a Commissioner wanted to take an
affirmative action, all he would have to do is phrase his actions in the
negative.
For example, imagine a situation where the Commissioner wanted to
use his "best interests" power to order inter-league play. In addition,
assume that one of the television networks would be willing to pay a
great amount of money for the rights to show baseball games if there
was interleague play. Under current voting requirements, it would take
a three-fourths vote by the teams to have inter-league play. If a majority
of the owners, but not three-fourths, voted for the plan it would still be
244. MLA oF 1995 art. I, § 2(b) (1995).
245. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Vincent, No. 92 c4398, at 11-13 (N.D.III.
1992).
246. Icd at 11.
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rejected. Assuming baseball's current financial woes, if a Commissioner
wanted he could simply state that he was using his "best interests" power
and ordering inter-league play in order to prevent the financial destruc-
tion of baseball. Since the Commissioner would be using his powers in a
preventative manner, specifically to prevent the destruction of baseball,
logic dictates that he could accomplish his goal. In the end, more impor-
tance would be placed on form rather than substance.
2. Inferences from Other MLA Articles
In addition, even if limitations are not read directly from the Com-
missioner's "best interests" power contained in Article I, Section 2(b),
limitations can be inferred from the language of other Articles in the
MLA. In contract law there is a concept called the canons of construc-
tion. One principle of these canons is that "specific terms and exact
terms are given greater weight than general language[.] ''247
In Article VII, Section 1 of the MLA, there is a clause that requires
any dispute between the Major League Teams to be submitted to the
Commissioner, who then acts as arbitrator in the matter. However, the
clause has an exception for disputes whose resolution is expressly pro-
vided for by other means.
Whereas Article I, Section 2 is not clearly defined, Article VII, Sec-
tion 1 is clear on the Commissioner's authority to deal with disputes be-
tween Major League Teams. According to the canons of construction,
the provision in Article VII, Section 1 would supersede the "best inter-
ests" clause in Article I, Section 2.
The Chicago Cubs used this exact argument in its lawsuit against Fay
Vincent to show that the Commissioner did not have the authority to
order division realignment.248 In his appeal brief, Vincent argued that
the other Articles of the Major League Agreement did not supersede the
"best interests" authority but augmented it.249 The crux of Vincent's
argument was that if the other Articles limited the Commissioner's "best
interests" power, the "best interests" power would be severely eroded.
The Cubs countered that if the "best interests" clause were as broad
as Vincent claimed, there would be no need for the other Articles to
augment the Commissioner's "best interests" power. The "best inter-
247. R.STATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(c) (1981).
248. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Vincent, No. 92 c4398 at 4-7.
249. Defendant's Appellate Brief at 18, Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Vincent,
No. 92 c4398 at 4-7.
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ests" clause would be unlimited in scope and it is impossible to broaden
an unlimited clause. °
The Atlanta Braves court declared that the breadth of the "best inter-
ests" clause was not unlimited. 5' Specifically, the court held that the
list of punitive sanctions in Section 3 of Article I limited the Coimis-
sioner's power to punish under the "best interests" clause. 52
3. Intentions of the Original Signatories to the MLA
An argument can be made that the clubs did not intend the Commis-
sioner to have unlimited powers to use his "best interests" authority be-
cause the original owners could never have intended that the
Commissioner would be able to completely change the structure of
baseball.
The difficulty with this argument is that the original signatories prob-
ably never conceived of a Commissioner trying to alter the structure of
baseball. The fact is that they did not expressly mention in the MLA
that they considered the issue.
The owners went to great lengths to establish the structure of base-
ball. It seems extremely unlikely that those owners ever intended for a
Commissioner to be able to undo the work that they so diligently put
forth.
4. Due Process Constraints
A final argument put forth by the courts is that the Commissioner's
use of his "best interests" authority must be in accord with basic proce-
dural fairness.
In Finley, the court stated that "the basic rudiments of due process of
law" must be followed. 2 3 However, by "due process" the court was not
speaking of Constitutional Due Process, but fairness in the interpreta-
tion of the MLA.
Similar to the author's interpretation of Finley, the court in Landis
stated that the Commissioner's "best interests" power "may not be exer-
cised in an illegal manner, that is fraudulently, arbitrarily, without legal
basis for the same or without any evidence to justify action.""
250. Plaintiff's Appellate Brief at 35. ld.
251. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F.Supp. 1213, 1224-25 (1977).
252. It.
253. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 544 (7th Cir. 1978).
254. Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 98,303 (N.D.Ill. 1931), appeal dismissed, 61
F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1931).
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In Atlanta Braves, the court examined Commissioner Kuhn's differ-
ing punishments to the Atlanta Braves and the St. Louis Cardinals for
the same offense of tampering255 The court stated that Kuhn was justi-
fied in punishing the Braves more than the Cardinals because the Braves
had committed a prior offense and had been warned more times than the
Cardinals. 36 The fact that the court examined the issue of fairness im-
plies that if the court did not find a justification for the disparaging pun-
ishments, it would have found that Kuhn acted arbitrarily and held that
the Commissioner was not authorized to use his "best interests" power
in such a manner.
The Rose case was based on allegations that the Commissioner did
not "follow his own procedural rules in conducting the investigation of
Rose's alleged gambling activities." 7 In that case, the Ohio court is-
sued a temporary restraining order based on the allegations brought by
Rose. 58
Although a court has never overturned a Commissioner's decision
based on procedural fairness, a court would probably overrule a Com-
missioner's decision if it believed that he did not follow procedural fair-
ness. Therefore, a Commissioner's "best interests" power may be limited
by procedural fairness.
D. Resolution
The courts have not settled the issue of how the Commissioner's
"best interests" power should be interprested. Yet, the MLA amend-
ments of 1994 may have made the question moot because under the cur-
rent MLA, the Commissioner's "best interests" power are very broad.
Nevertheless, the author will discuss this issue using the 1993 version of
the MLA.
The language of the "best interests" clause of Article I, Section 2
does not contain any express limiting language. The clause implies that
the Commissioner is only authorized to negative uses of his "best inter-
ests" power. However, it is easy for a Commissioner to phrase an affirm-
ative use of his "best interests" power in the negative. Thus, this
inference does not appear to limit the Commissioner.
On the other hand, there are limits to the Commissioner's powers.
The court in Atlanta Braves stated that the enumerated list of sanctions
255. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F.Supp. 1213, 1223 (1977).
256. ld.
257. See Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F.Supp. 906, 918 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
258. Id at 908.
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in Article I, Section 3 contains the only punitive choices available to the
Commissioner. Yet, even with these limited punitive choices, the Com-
missioner still has the power to punish an act or procedure. Therefore,
such a limitation seems minor. Additionally, the court in Finley held
that this list does not restrict the Commissioner's choice when his actions
are remedial or preventative in nature.
The canons of construction argument made above is plausible, in that
the more specific sections of the MLA supersede the less specific "best
interests" power. As the court in Chicago Cubs declared, the Commis-
sioner cannot act as an arbitrator when dispute resolution is expressly
provided for by other means. However, the power to act as an arbitrator
is not the main source of the Commissioner's power. This limitation is
also minor in nature and barely affects the Commissioner's overall
authority.
The court in Finley implies that the Commissioner is bound by proce-
dural fairness considerations. Thus far, the courts have suggested that
procedural fairness is followed, as long as the Commissioner does not act
in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Once the courts have found that
the Commissioner's actions were reasonable, they have refused to ques-
tion the logic of his decisions.
In conclusion, there are a few minor limits on the Commissioner's
"best interests" power. Overall, there is little that the Commissioner can-
not substantively do under his "best interests" power, provided he
phrases the order in the negative and does not violate procedural fair-
ness guidelines.
V. CONCLUSION: AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF THE
COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
A. Problems with the Commissioner's Role
As stated earlier, the original signatories to the MLA created the
Commissioner to act as the moral protector of baseball. However, over
time, the creation of radio and television created financial concerns that
did not exist in 1921 when the Commissioner's office was created.25 9 Ini-
tially, the Commissioners were not empowered to handle the changing
financial conditions in baseball. When the owners began authorizing the
Commissioners' involvement in the financial matters of the game, the
owners found that some of the Commissioners, like Fay Vincent, were
not qualified to handle their responsibilities. Following Commissioner
259. See supra part III.G.
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Vincent's term in office, the owners have increased the Commissioner's
role to include greater involvment in the business affairs of baseball.260
However, it is dangerous to grant a substantial amount of power to
the Commissioner, who has a smaller financial interest in baseball than
the owners. The Commissioner has many conflicting roles. The Com-
missioner serves the owners' interests and chairs various owners' com-
mittees, including the committees that negotiate television and labor
contracts. At the same time, the Commissioner must serve the players'
interests in employment and financial matters, not to mention keeping
the public satisfied with the game of baseball. Conflicts are inevitable,
and this type of power in the hands of one person can lead to harmful
results.
1. Executive Council
In the absence of a Commissioner, the Executive Council is a dy-
namic body empowered to handle both business and moral matters in
baseball. The National Commission, which preceded the Commis-
sioner's office, was a model similar to that of the Executive Council.26'
Both were made up of team owners with one owner serving as the head
figure.
However, in the end, the Executive Council would probably fail as a
governing body for many of the same reasons why the National Commis-
sion failed. The National Commission failed because the owners in each
League accused the Commission of being controlled by the other
League. Every decision that the Commission made led to more dis-
enchantment among the owners towards the Commission. 6
The Executive Council would eventually run into insurmountable
conflicts. Eventually, teams not represented on the Council would feel
that their particular interests did not matter. In addition, at some point
the Council would have to handle an issue that directly affected the in-
terests of the Council members. Conflicts of interest would arise that
would ultimately jeopardize the integrity of the Council. Eventually, the
competitive nature of the owners would lead to its downfall.
Another reason why the Council would not work is because the re-
sponsibilities of the members would require an owner to serve as a full-
time employee. However, the owners have their own teams to run and
other businesses to run as well. Simply put, most if not all owners do not
260. See supra part III.F.
261. See supra part I.B.
262. See supra part I.C.
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have the time to run the office. Given the choice, the owners most likely
do not want the day-to-day responsibility of governing the affairs of
baseball.
B. Two Commissioners
The Commissioner's duties are broken down into two parts: protec-
tor of the moral integrity of baseball and the CEO of baseball. In the
past the owners sought Commissioners that they believed could maintain
the moral integrity of baseball. The Commissioner, at one time, did not
have many business responsibilities and could utilize most of his time
protecting the image of baseball. For the most part the owners have
been satisfied with the Commissioner's role as "moral protector" of
baseball.
However, the owners have not been pleased with the overall per-
formances of the Commissioners when it comes to the business aspect of
baseball. It has been difficult for the owners to find a person who can
protect the moral integrity of the game and, at the same time, success-
fully run the business affairs of the game.
One alternative model could be the creation of a two Commissioner
office, where the position is broken up into two distinct roles. One indi-
vidual would function as the "business" Commissioner and the other
would be the "integrity" Commissioner.
The advantage of this system is that owners could separate the rigor-
ous responsibilities required of only one Commissioner. Broadly speak-
ing, the "business" Commissioner would serve the concerns of the
owners and the owners' interests only. These issues would include the
various committees involving the player's association, labor contracts
and arbitration. At the same time, the "integrity" Commissioner could
address the distinct problems associated with the image of baseball. This
person would not necessarily have to answer to the owners' concerns,
but more to the public's concerns. In such a system, the owners could
alleviate the various conflicts of interest problems that one Commis-
sioner usually faces. Two Commissioners with clearly defined roles could
improve the efficiency of the office.
However, there are some disadvantages to such a system. The re-
duced prestige of being one of two Commissioners might cause difficul-
ties for the owners in finding qualified persons. Furthermore, two
Commissioners raises the possibility of further conflicts. While it is plau-
sible that their roles could be differentiated, issues could certainly arise
that both would feel was their exclusive responsibility. Alternatively,
personality conflicts may make the office less efficient and cause further
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tension in baseball matters. Along the same lines, one Commissioner
could be regarded as more important than the other, resulting in favorit-
ism and non-productive feuds.
The owners should consider this proposal and other alternatives in
regard to the Commissioner's role for the future. Whether this role will
remain the same or drasticallly change, it is clear that the Commis-
sioner's Office at least has the dual responsibility of governing the big
business of Major League Baseball and weaving its moral character.

